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feat(rules): New BindFlt DLL loaded by an unusual process rule#679

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bindfltapi-loaded-by-an-unusual-process
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feat(rules): New BindFlt DLL loaded by an unusual process rule#679
rabbitstack wants to merge 1 commit into
masterfrom
bindfltapi-loaded-by-an-unusual-process

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What is the purpose of this PR / why it is needed?

Detects the loading of bindfltapi.dll, bindflt.dll, or bindlink.dll DLL family that represents the user-mode API surface of the Windows Bind Filter driver (bindflt.sys) by processes outside the known legitimate consumer set. The Bind Filter driver allows administrator-level callers to create transparent, application-invisible redirections from a virtual file system path to an arbitrary local or remote backing path. While legitimately used by WSL2, Windows Containers, Windows Sandbox, Hyper-V, and MSIX packaging, this capability has been weaponised in multiple public tools to perform EDR and AV evasion.

What type of change does this PR introduce?


Uncomment one or more /kind <> lines:

/kind feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)

/kind bug-fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

/kind refactor (non-breaking change that restructures the code, while not changing the original functionality)

/kind breaking (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to not work as expected

/kind cleanup

/kind improvement

/kind design

/kind documentation

/kind other (change that doesn't pertain to any of the above categories)

Any specific area of the project related to this PR?


Uncomment one or more /area <> lines:

/area instrumentation

/area telemetry

/area rule-engine

/area filters

/area yara

/area event

/area captures

/area alertsenders

/area outputs

/area rules

/area filaments

/area config

/area cli

/area tests

/area ci

/area build

/area docs

/area deps

/area evasion

/area other

Special notes for the reviewer


Does this PR introduce a user-facing change?


Detects the loading of bindfltapi.dll, bindflt.dll, or bindlink.dll DLL family that  represents user-mode API surface of the Windows Bind Filter driver (bindflt.sys) by processes outside the known legitimate consumer set. The Bind Filter driver allows administrator-level callers to create transparent, application-invisible redirections from a virtual file system path to an arbitrary local or remote backing path.
While legitimately used by WSL2, Windows Containers, Windows Sandbox, Hyper-V, and MSIX packaging, this capability has been weaponised in multiple public tools to perform EDR and AV evasion.
@rabbitstack rabbitstack added the rules Anything related to detection rules label Jun 16, 2026
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